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for rent. Even without an eviction the mortgagee, not being in privity of estate or contract with the lessee, has no claim for rent in the absence of attomment. Merchants
Union Trust Co. v. New PhiladelphiaGraphite Co., io Del. Ch. 18, 83 At. 520 (1912);
Bartlett v. Hitchcock, io Ill. App. 87 (1881); Burke v. Willard, 243 Mass. 547, 137 N.E.
744 (1923); 2 Jones, Mortgages (8th ed. 1928), § 982; 1 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant
(I912), § 73. To hold there is an eviction of the tenant would defeat the purpose of
receiverships as a conservation measure to protect the rights of the parties, especially
in view of the possibility that the mortgagor may redeem and thus there might never
be a final decree of foreclosure.

Sales-Liability of Manufacturer of Food Products to Consumer-[Michigan].Plaintiff purchased pork from a retailer packed by defendant. Her husband died from
trichinosis caused by eating the pork raw, and plaintiff brought suit against defendant
for breach of warranty. Held, a warranty of fitness for consumption will not be implied
to cover such an unusual use of a food product since only a very small amount of pork
sold is eaten raw and the danger of infection is negligible if the pork is cooked. Cheli v.
Cudahy Bros., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N.W. 414 (1934).
Under modern practice in food distribution, where many intermediaries come between manufacturer and consumer, it has appeared undesirable to limit the consumer
to the traditional action against his immediate vendor for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for consumption. Some courts, unable to bridge the gap of lack of
privity, hold there can be no implied warranty running with the chattel on which to
found an action by the consumer against the manufacturer. Collins Baking Co. v.
Savage, 227 Ala. 408, I5o So. 336 (1933); Newhall v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434,
134 N.E. 625 (1922); Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1925);
Connecticut Pie Co. v. Lynch, 57 F. (2d) 447 (App. D. C. 1932); 28 Mich. L. Rev. 89
(1929). But other courts do hold that an implied warranty of fitness runs with the
chattel in the case of food products. Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.(2) 199
(1933); Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924); Curtiss Candy Co. v.
Johnson, 163 Miss. 426, 141 So. 762 (1932). The latter view is often made subject to
qualifications. Thus, it has been held the warranty of the manufacturer is merely that
the article was fit for consumption when it left his plant, the burden being on plaintiff
to show it was not. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Boshin, 155 So. 217 (Miss. 1934). But if the
food reaches the consumer in its original package it is presumed to be in the same condition then as it was when packed. Coco-ColaBottling Works v. Simpson, 158 Miss. 390,
130 So. 479 (193o); see Cudahzy Packing Co. v. Boshin, 155 So. 217 (Miss. 1934). The
principal case adds the qualification that the warranty extends only to fitness for consumption in the usual manner.
Lack of privity does not prevent a manufacturer of food products from being liable
to a consumer because of negligence. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 246 Ky.
65, 54 S.W. (2d) 612 (1932); Reichenbacher v. Cal. Packing Co., 250 Mass. 198, 145
N.E. 281 (1924); Cassini v. Curtiss Candy Co., 113 N. J. L. 91, 172 Atl. 519 (1934);
33 Col. L. Rev. 868 (1933). The difficulty of the consumer's proving specific acts of
negligence on the part of the manufacturer has led the courts to make certain concessions in favor of the consumer. Thus some courts have found negligence in the breach
of a pure food statute resulting in injury to the consumer, who is a member of the class
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intended to be protected by the statute. Benes v. Campion, 186 Minn. 578, 244 N.W.
72 (1932); Burnette v. Augusta Coca-Cola Co., 157 S.C. 359, 154 S.E. 645 (193o). One
court may, perhaps, be regarded as holding that the presence of a harmful substance in
food amounts to negligence per se. Rozumailski v. PhiladelphiaCoca-ColaCo., 296 Pa.
114, 145 AtI. 700 (1924). The doctrine of res ipsa loquiturhas also been applied, the
presence of the harmful substance giving rise to a presumption of negligence by the
manufacturer. Coleman v. Dublin Coca-ColaCo., 47 Ga. App. 369, 170 S.E. 549 (1933);
Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W. (2d) 701 (1930); contra, Tonsman v.
Greenglass, 248 Mass. 275, 142 N.E. 756 (1924); Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola Co., 196
N.C. 69o, 145 S.E. 14 (1928). In any event plaintiff need only show the presence of an
injurious substance in the food when it was shipped from the manufacturer's plant
and consequent injury to make out a primafacie case of negligence. Goldman & Freiman v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488, 117 AtI. 866 (1922); De Groat v. Ward Baking Co., 102
N. J. L. I88, 13o Ad. 540 (1925); Campbell Soup Co. v. Davis, 175 S.E. 743 (Va. 1934).
And the presence of the foreign substance at the time of shipment may be inferred.
Doyle v. Continental Baking Co., 262 Mass. V16, 16o N.E. 325 (1928). The courts apparently being desirous of holding the manufacturer liable on one theory or another, for
injury caused by defective food, the theory of an implied warranty of fitness running
with the chattel seems commendable as the simplest way to reach the desired result.

Trusts-Salary Received by Trustee as Corporate Official-[Maryland].-A co-trustee, by virtue of the trustees' holding one-half of the stock of a corporation in trust, was
elected secretary of the corporation at a salary of fifty dollars per week. In an accounting by the trustee, it was held, the cestui is entitled to one-half of the salary received
without interest. Mangels v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 173 Atl. I91 (Md.
1934).
The court relied on the well-established rule that a trustee will not be permitted
to deal with his trust so as to gain profit for himself; he may not retain any advantage
gained directly or indirectly because of his position; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. (U.S.)
503 (1846); Magruderv. Drury, 235 U.S. lo6 (1914); Linsley v. Strang, 149 Ia. 690, 126
N.W. 941 (igio); Williams v. Barton, [1927] 2 Ch. 9; 3 Bogert, Trusts (I935), § 492;
Lewin, Trusts (i 3 th ed. 1928), 251. It is immaterial that the trustee rendered a fair
equivalent to the estate, and that the estate has not been injured, for the rule rests on
the rigid policy of equity against allowing the trustee to be in any position where his
self-interest and his interest as trustee may possibly conflict. Hoyt v. Latham, 143 U.S.
553 (x891); Kaln v. Chapin, 152 N.Y. 305, 46 N.E. 489 (1897); Perry on Trusts (7 th
ed. 1929), § 427; Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4 th ed. 1918), § 958. The vigor of
this policy led to a denial at first of any commissions to the trustee, in the absence of a
provision in the trust instrument, for his work as trustee. Egbert v. Brooks, 3 Harr.
(Del.) iio (184o); Green v. Winter, i Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 26 (1814); Ayliffe v. Murray,
2 Atk. (Eng.) 58 (1740); Barrett v. Hartley, L.R. 2 Eq. 789 (i866). That rule no longer
prevails. Barney v. Saunders, 16 How. (U.S.) 534 (1853); Howard v. Hunt, 267 Mass.
185, 166 N.E. 568 (1929); Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 313 Mo. 552, 281 S.W.
744 (1925). See 42 Yale L. J. 771 (1933).
There is a tendency in some jurisdictions to regard the rule that a trustee may not
profit from his trust as not inflexible. Thus one court allows a trustee commissions for

